The emergence of integrated private reporting by Atkins, Jill Frances et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/131585/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Atkins, Jill Frances, Solomon, Aris, Norton, Simon and Joseph, Nathan Lael 2015. The emergence
of integrated private reporting. Meditari Accountancy Research 23 (1) , pp. 28-61.
10.1108/MEDAR-01-2014-0002 file 
Publishers page: http://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-01-2014-0002 <http://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-01-
2014-0002>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
  
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:  
www.emeraldinsight.com/2049-372X.htm  
 
 
  
 
 
The  emergence  of  integrated  
 private  reporting  
Jill Frances Atkins  
BISA, Henley Business School, Henley, UK  
Aris Solomon  
Faculty of Business, Athabasca University, Alberta, Canada  
Simon Norton  
Business School, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff, UK, and  
Nathan Lael Joseph  
Department of Accounting and Finance, Aston Business School,  
Birmingham, UK  
 
 
 
Abstract  
Purpose  –  This  paper  aims  to  provide  evidence  to  suggest  that  private  social  and  environmental  
reporting   (i.e.   one-on-one   meetings   between   institutional   investors   and   investees   on   social   and  
environmental  issues)  is  beginning  to  merge  with  private  fnancial  reporting  and  that,  as  a  result,  
integrated private reporting is emerging.  
Design/methodology/approach  – In this paper, 19 FTSE100 companies and 20 UK institutional  
investorswereinterviewed to discover trends in private integrated reporting and to gaugewhether  
private reporting is genuinelybecoming integrated. Theemergence of integrated private reporting  
through  the  lens  of  institutional  logics  was  interpreted.  The  emergence  of  integrated  private  
reporting  as  a  merging  of  two  hitherto  separate  and  possibly  rival  institutional  logics  was  
framed.  
Findings  –  It  was  found  that  specialist  socially  responsible  investment  managers  are  starting  to  
attend  private  fnancial  reporting  meetings,  while  mainstream  fund  managers  are  starting  to  attend  
private  meetings  on  environmental,  social  and  governance  (ESG)  issues.  Further,  senior  company  
directors are becoming increasingly conversant with ESG issues.  
Research  limitations/implications  –  The  fndings  were  interpreted  as  two  possible  scenarios:  
there  is  a  genuine  hybridisation  occurring  in  the  UK  institutional  investment  such  that  integrated  
private  reporting  is  emerging  or  the  fnancial  logic  is  absorbing  and  effectively  neutralising  the  
responsible investment logic.  
Practical  implications  –  These fndings provide evidence of emergent integrated private reporting  
which  are  useful  to  both  the  corporate  and  institutional  investment  communities  as  they  plan  their  
engagement meetings.  
Originality/value  –  No  study  has  hitherto  examined  private  social  and  environmental  reporting  
through  interview  research  from  the  perspective  of  emergent  integrated  private  reporting.  This  is  the  
frst paper to discuss integrated reporting in the private reporting context.  
  Keywords  Corporate governance, Qualitative research, Corporate social responsibility,  
Accounting theory  
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1.  Introduction  
Prior literature and observation of policy/practice suggest substantial change in the UK  
institutional investment in recent years. Private communication channels have evolved  
in the form of private fnancial reporting[1], spurred on by the UK agenda for corporate  
 
 
governancereform initiated by the Cadbury Report (1992). Thesemeetings have tended  
to  focus  entirely  on  fnancial  issues  and  have  represented  a  way  for  shareholders  to  
encourage  companies  to  embody  beliefs  and  behaviours  consistent  with  shareholder  
value  (Roberts  et  al., 2006).  Thus,  the  process  of  engagement  and  dialogue  between  
 
investors and investees has been preoccupied by fnancial issues. A strand of academic  
literature  bears  witness  to  the  emergence  of  a  parallel,  potentially  rival,  form  of  
institutional  investor  engagement,  namely,  “responsible  investment”.  Earlier  forms  
of  responsible  investment  referred  to  as  “ethical  investment”,  socially  responsible  
investment,  etc.  represented  a  marginal  area  of  dedicated  fund  management  where  
portfolios were positively and/or negatively screened according to ethical principles[2]  
Theseforms have evolved into a “best in sector”investment strategy where no industry  
is  excluded  but  investors  concentrate  on  the  “best”  performers  within  industries  
according  to  environmental,  social  and  governance  (ESG)  criteria.  This  relatively  new  
strategic  departure  epitomises  what  is  now  termed  “responsible  investment”  and  has  
allowed  consideration  of  ESG  issues  to  be  applied  across  mainstream  investment  
portfolios[3].  
One  mechanism  of  responsible  investment  is  private  social  and  environmental  
reporting  (SER),  involving  one-on-one  meetings  between  companies  and  their  core  
institutional  investors  (usually  meetings  between  the  corporate  social  responsibility  
[CSR] and socially responsible investment [SRI] managers) on ESG issues[4]. Academic  
studies  suggest  that  these  meetings  run  in  tandem,  taking  place  entirely  separately,  
from  one-on-one  on  fnancial  issues,  i.e.  private  fnancial  reporting[5].  A  recent  study  
adopting  a  sociological  perspective  showed  that  private  SER  is  characterised  by  
signifcant elements of impression management and that the “myth” created within the  
meetings  of  a  responsible  investor  and  a  responsible  company,  by  both  parties,  was  
more  concerned  with  presenting  a  front  than  with  genuine  accountability  (Solomon  
et al., forthcoming)[6].  In  other  words,  the  paper  suggested  that  private  SER,  although  
quite well-developed, appears to have little impact on investment decision-making.  
In the public reporting sphere, until relatively recently, sustainability reporting has  
also  remained  generally  separate  from  published  fnancial  reporting,  mirroring  the  
similar separation in private reporting. However, in the past three years, there has been  
a  substantial  shift,  with  the  emergence  of  integrated  reporting  internationally.  The  
latest triannual survey of corporate responsibility reporting byKPMG (2011) recogn  
the  beginnings  of  a  shift  internationally  from  separate  corporate  responsibility  and  
sustainability   reporting.   An   integrated   report   integrates   material   social   and  
environmental  information  into  the  core  reporting  vehicle,  a  company’s  annual  report  
(King Report, 2009; International Integrated ReportingCommittee (IIRC), 2011;Solomon  
and Maroun, 2012):  
An  integrated  report  is  not  simply  an  amalgamation  of  the  fnancial  statements  and  the  
sustainability  report.  It  incorporates,  in  clear  language,  material information from  these  and  
other sources to enable stakeholders to evaluate the organisation’s performance and to make  
aninformedassessment about its ability to create and sustain value[…]. By its very nature an  
integrated report cannotsimply be a reporting by-product. It needs tofowfrom the heart of the  
  organisation  and  it  should  be  the  organisation’s  primary  report  to  stakeholders  (Mervyn  
King’s  Foreword,  Integrated  Reporting  Committee  of  South  Africa  (IRCSA),  2011, p. 1,    
emphasis added).  
SouthAfrica, through the publication of the third King Report on Corporate Governance  
(2009),was the frst country to adopt integrated reporting as a listingrequirement for the  
  country’s  stock  exchange,  the  Johannesburg  Stock  Exchange  (IRCSA,  2011,  Solomon  
and Maroun, 2012). The IIRC has, for some time, been working towards recommending  
and  requiring  companies  worldwide  to  produce  integrated  reports  (IIRC,  2011,  2013).  
IIRC (2013) explai  
thinking within an organisation, defning integrated thinking as:  
[…]  the  active  consideration  by  an  organisation  of  the  relationships  between  its  various  
operating and functional units and the capitals that the organisation uses of affects. Integrated  
thinking leads to integrateddecision-making and actions that consider the creation of value of  
the short, medium and long term (IIRC, 2013,p.3).  
The fndings of a recent study (Solomon andMaroun, 2012) painted acomplex picture of  
the  impact  of  the  introduction  of  integrated  reporting  on  the  reporting  of  social,  
environmental  and  ethical  (SEE)  information  in  South  African  companies’  annual  
reports. There was an undeniable increase in the quantity of SEE information reported  
as  a  result  of  King  III’s  requirement.  The  study  found  SEE  information  appears  
throughout  a  signifcantly  greater  number  of  sections  of  the  reports  for  2010/2011  
compared  to  2009,  before  the  introduction  of  IR.  However,  a  striking  weakness  of  the  
integration  of  SEE  information  was  signifcant  repetition  throughout  the  reports.  The  
authors  suggested  that  perhaps  the  reporters  were  unclear  about  what  an  integrated  
report “should” look like and what it “should” include.  
The views of South African institutional investors towards the usefulness of the new  
integrated  reports  have  been  canvassed  recently  (Atkins  and  Maroun,  2014).  From  
interviews with 20 members of the South African institutional investment community,  
the study derived a series of key fndings for policymakerswhichinform the IR agenda,  
summarised as follows:  
•    The    South    African    institutional    investment    community    welcomes    the  
introduction  of  IR,  and,  despite  identifying  concerns  and  obstacles,  they  look  
forward  to  its  development  and  progress,  viewing  IR  as  an  improvement  in  
disclosures for investment decision-making.  
•    The  introduction  of  mandatory  IR  in  South  Africa  is  seen  as  enhancing  
signifcantly   South   Africa’s   reputation   in   global   fnancial   markets   and  
competitiveness.  
•    South  African  institutional  investors  identifed  several  areas  where  they  felt  
IR should be improved: reports should be shorter and less complex, they need  
to  be  de-cluttered;  repetition  should  be  avoided;  a  box-ticking,  compliance  
approach should be avoided.  
•    Several obstacles to the development of IR were identifed including: the need  
to avoid capture of the agenda by auditors and reporting consultants; the need  
to  avoid  impression  management  by  corporate  preparers;  and  the  need  to  
address lack of fnancial literacy among trustees of pension funds.  
•    Important  recommendations  for  improving  IR  were  identifed,  including:  the  
need forcompanies to engagemorewith their institutional investors on the content of  
their  integrated  reports;  there  should  be  a  drive  to  raise  the  awareness  of  South  
African asset owners and pension fund trustees towardsmateriality of ESG issues to  
 
 
their  investment  portfolios’  performance;  the  need  for  companies  to  engage  more  
effectively with their non-fnancial stakeholders; the need for corporate boards of  
directors to be more involved in the process of producing integrated reports; the  
need for an explicit IRframework to be developed to assist preparers; IR should be  
  
focussed  more  on  broader  stakeholder  accountability  rather  than  just  aimed  at  
shareholders, refecting a more holistic approach to reporting; companies should  
facilitate continuing fnancial education for their employees.  
 
This  paper  seeks  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  an  integrated  approach  to  reporting  is  
emerging  in  the  private  reporting  sphere.  We  interpret  the  possible  emergence  of  
integrated  private  reporting  through  the  lens  of  neoinstitutional  theory,  especially  the  
concept of institutional logics. Thedominance of the long-standing fnanceparadigm of  
shareholder value and agency theory, which typically excludes “non-fnancial” factors  
may be diminishing. This paper explores whether there are changes within the private  
SER  process,  according  to  the  views  of  the  corporate  community,  which  may  be  
symptomatic of a shift in the dominant paradigm underlying fnancial markets. Private  
SER,  traditionally  marginalised  within  institutional  investment  may  be  embedding  
itselfwithin a short space oftimewithin the heart ofmainstreaminvestment activity but  
there is currently littleempirical evidence of such a shift.As private SER and private  
fnancial  reporting  are  increasingly  frequent  and  becoming  signifcant  areas  of  
corporate  accounting  and  accountability,  this  paper  responds  to  a  call  for  further  
research  into  the  coexistence  of  competing,  plural  logics  especially  within  the  
accounting feld:  
[…]  a  focus  on  institutional  rationality  in  the  form  of  multiple,  competing  logics  can  be  
particularly  fruitful.  While  there  has  been  some  good  work  in  this  direction,  much  more  
needs to be done to understand where logics and new practices come from and how they  
relate  to  each  other.  Accounting  provides  a  crucial  context  to  explore  these  issues  and  
since institutional and practice theories are prevalent perspectives within the community  
of  behavioral  accounting  researchers,  accounting  scholars  are  in  a  prime  position  to  
contribute valuable knowledge to our understanding of the dynamics of institutions and  
practice (Lounsbury, 2008, p. 358).  
Although several studies have investigated the views of institutional investors towards  
private SER and its evolution, there has hardly been any attempt to canvas the views of  
the  corporate  community  regarding  the  usefulness,  function,  content  and  evolution  of  
private   SER.   Solomon   and   Darby’s   (2005)   study   
managers   from   FTSE100   companies,   but,   in   general,   studies   have   focussed   on  
institutional  investors’  views.  Institutional  investors  represent  a  distinct  professional  
institutional grouping and are therefore an apt focus for investigation into institutional  
logics  but  similarly  corporates  are  involved  in  private  SER  and  represent  signifcant  
institutions  requiring  study.  Institutions  have  been  defned  as  supraorganisational  
patterns of activity bywhich individuals and organisations produce and reproduce their  
material  subsistence  and  organise  time  and  space,  as  well  as  being  symbolic  systems,  
ways  of  ordering  reality,  which  render  time  and  space  meaningful  (Friedland  and  
  
  
 
 
Alford, 1991). Institutions are also thought to be guided by a distinct institutional logic.  
In this paper, we provide evidence pertaining to the evolution of private SER (as a core  
responsible  investment  mechanism)  to  indicate  whether  the  dominant  fnance  logic  in  
institutional  investment  may  be  metamorphosing  into  a  broader,  holistic  logic  of  
investment strategy and decision-making. This paper aims to:  
 
  
•    Interpret the recent evolution of institutional investment and the development of  
responsible investment through the lens of institutional logics.  
•    Research   the   perceptions   of   representatives   from   FTSE100   companies   and  
institutional investors, involved directly in private SER regarding its evolution.  
•    Explore  the  extent  to  which  an  integrated  approach  is  emerging  in  private  
reporting.  
•    Refer to neoinstitutional theory and institutional logics to interpret this potential  
integration.  
 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  discuss  existing  
literature relating to private SER, aswell as anoverview of the practitionerenvironment  
and  a  discussion  of  relevant  theoretical  work.  In  this  section,  we  seek  to  interpret  the  
evolution  of  responsible  investment  through  the  lens  of  institutional  logics.  Section  3  
outlines  our  research  method.  In  Section  4,  we  present  our  research  fndings  from  
interviews  with  19  FTSE100  companies  and  20  institutional  investors,  and  the  paper  
concludes with a discussion in Section 5.  
 
2.  Prior  literature  and  theoretical  framework  
2.1 Competing institutional logics  
There is a long history of investigation into theway inwhich institutions, organisations  
and  society  change  and  shift  over  time.  Institutional  theory  investigates  structural  
change  and  shifts  in  the  status  quo.  A  perennial  issue  addressed  by  institutional  
research is the diffculty of overthrowing the status quo:  
[…] actorsmayoverthrow institutional structures (such as organizationalforms), rejecting the  
status quo of how to do things, but underlying patterns of privilege may remain untouched, or  
even be strengthened – reinforcing the status quo of who benefts (Greenwood and Suddaby,  
2006, p. 43).  
Indeed,   neoinstitutional   theory   and   institutional   logics   focus   on   how,   and   if,  
institutional  status  quo  may  be  transformed.  As  it  has  evolved,  neoinstitutional  
theory has shifted from focussing on isomorphism and mimetic change processes to  
a  more  multidimensional  approach  where  competing  logics  and  heterogeneity  are  
accepted  within  organisational  models  (Lounsbury, 2008;  Scott, 2008).  This  “new”  
approach  is  traced  back  to  that  of  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977),  where  perceptions  of  
earlier    “two-stage    model”    of    diffusion    and    associated    notions    such    as  
“institutionalisation” and “isomorphism” being replaced by notions of institutional  
environments   being   more   fragmented   and   contested,   infuenced   by   “multiple,  
competing  logics”  (Lounsbury, 2007).  Logics  can  be  competing  and  diverse,  with  
institutional  environments  being  understood  as  pluralistic  (Meyer  and  Rowan,  
1977).  Indeed,  the  concept  of  institutional  logics  has  evolved  which  encompasses  
competing  forms  of  practice  (Lounsbury, 2008,  p.  353).  Logics  at  the  societal  level  
may be the capitalistmarket, or the nuclearfamily (Lounsbury, 2008).At the level of  
industries,  logics  focus  on  decision-makers  and  on  a  series  of  issues  and  solutions  
(Lounsbury, 2008).  Further,  institutional  logics  have  been  interpreted  as  cultural  
beliefs that shape the “cognitions and behaviours of actors” (Dunn and Jones, 2010).  
Contending  logics  can  fundamentally  shape  variation  in  practices  and  behaviour  
 
 
within an industry. For instance, Lounsbury (2007) examin  
to independent professionalmoneymanagementfrmsamongUSmutual funds.Mutual  
fund frms were run according to the logic of trusteeship, whereby their main goal was    
to  focus  on  conservative,  long-term  investment.  Consequently  in  the  mid-twentieth  
century,mutual funds consisted chiefy of conservativelymanaged diversifedcommon  
stock   funds.   However,   the   growing   dominance   of   portfolio   theory   and   fnancial  
economics  ushered  in  professional  money  management  service  frms,  leading  to  the  
emergence ofperformance logic.Thisnewperformance logicwas characterised bymore  
aggressive investing techniques tomaximiseshort-term returns. Despite the increasing  
dominance  of  the  performance  logic,  the  trustee  logic  survived  to  some  extent  in  the  
mutual  fund  industry.  The  new  performance  logic  was  well-established  by  the  1960s,  
but  the  competing  trustee  logic  continued  to  thrive  in  the  1970s  as  more  passively  
managed index and other funds emerged.  
One  of  the  important  issues  raised  in  the  literature,  relating  to  competing  and  
coexisting institutional logics, is whether the values and mores underlying the different  
logics  are  compatible  or  contradictory.  For  example,  as  pointed  out  by  Laughlin et al.  
(1994),   
values perspective than medical care and fnancial considerations. It is this clash of values  
which   makes   hybridisation   extremely   diffcult.   The   people   pioneering   each   of   two  
competing logicsmay be espoused to entirely different valuesystems rendering ant genuine  
collaboration and eventual merging diffcult if not impossible. In fnancial investment, the  
likelihood that the underlying values of fnancial,mainstream fundmanagers and those of  
SRI managers is potentially miles apart. In terms of the people involved, many of those  
involved in the SRI“movement”comefrom asocial/environmental activist background.  
Conversely,   mainstream   fund   managers   tend   to   come   from   fnancial   investment  
training[7].  Dunn  and  Jones  look  at  the  signifcant  role  of  academic  education  in  
developing  the  competing  logics  in  healthcare.  Similarly,  the  role  of  professional  and  
academic  education  in  fnance/investment/accounting  in  helping  or  hindering  the  
advance of SRI cannot be overstated.  
Institutional  theory  has  been  used  extensively  within  the  accounting  literature  to  
analyse  and  interpret  changes  in  organisational  structure  and  policy  and  the  institutional  
(Lounsbury, 2008). In accounting, institutional theory has been used to interpret resistance to  
changewithin organisations, aswell as organisational changemore broadly (Laughlin, 1991;  
Laughlin et al., 1994;  Broadbent et al., 2001).    
especially useful in analysing institutionaldevelopmentswhen change happens suddenly or  
where  there  is  signifcant  resistance  to  change  from  existing  institutional  bodies  or  
structures.  Where  there  are  evolutions  in  thinking  and  evidence  of  shifts  in  social  
reality, aspects of neoinstitutional theory can serve to elucidate these changes and  
enhance  understanding.  Fiss (2008) e  
theory and emphasised the role of resistance to institutional change.  
The   concept   of   institutional   logics   is   frequently   applied   to   the   analysis   of  
institutional change and a logic is viewed as the:  
  
  […] socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs,  
and  rules  by  which  individuals  produce  and  reproduce  their  material  subsistence,  organize  
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality (Thornton, 2004, p. 69).  
Often, using longitudinal analysis, the evolution of an institutional feld is interpreted as  
the   shift   from   a   historically   dominant   logic   to   a   different,   contemporary   logic.  
  Historically oriented studies are common (Sine and David, 2003; Blatter, 2003; Castells,  2000; Zijderveld, 2000; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; Green et al., 2008).  
Competing logics were shown to co-exist, and rivalry between competing logics was  
found to be managed through the development of collaborative relationships (Reay and  
Hinings,  2009).  Dunn  and  Jones  (2010)  showed  
fuctuating  over  time  and  creating  dynamic  tensions.  Indeed,  they  emphasised  that  
institutional change did not necessarily involve the replacement of a dominant logic by  
another,  but  where  professions  operate  in  multiple  institutional  spheres,  plural  logics  
can thrive together. Specifcally, they identifed two logics central to medical education  
as  the  care  logic  and  the  science  logic  which  they  found  to  have  coexisted  over  a  long  
period oftime. An alternative is the hybridisation of logics where one aspect of a logic is  
effectively  absorbed  into  a  dominant  logic  as  tensions  within  a  profession  cannot  be  
sustained  over  time  (Dunn  and  Jones,  2010;  Suddaby  and  Greenwood,  2005).  We  now  
turn to analysing our research questions from the perspective of institutional logics.  
 
2.2 Emergence of a “responsible investment logic”  
Our  research  shows  that  the  institutional  logic  of  fnance,  whereby  only  core  fnancial  
indicators  are  considered,  has,  for  some  time,  coexisted  with  a  responsible  investment  
logic  such  that  private  SER  is  running  in  tandem  with  private  fnancial  reporting.  
Further,  we  seek  to  discover  the  extent  to  which,  if  at  all,  private  reporting  may  be  
adopting  an  integrated  approach,  mirroring  shifts  towards  integrated  reporting  in  the  
public reporting sphere.  
As  a  normative  basis  for  our  enquiry,  we  posit  that  the  ongoing  crisis  of  climate  
change and its severe repercussions not merely on the natural environment but also on  
societies   and   businesses   worldwide   are   unlikely   to   leave   the   fnancial   markets  
untouched.   Orthodox   models   which   ignore   “non-fnancial”   matters,   such   as   “the  
environment”,   we   suggest,   may   no   longer   be   suitable   to   economies   which   are  
increasingly   affected   by   the   symptoms   of   changing   climatic   conditions   (storms,  
unpredictable  weather  patterns,  crop  shortages,  droughts/foods,  rising  sea  levels,  
governmental pollution/carbon taxes, toname but a few). Financialmodels relied on for  
decades  by  the  institutional  investment  community  may  no  longer  suffce  in  the  new  
century where social and environmental issues are paramount. Similarly, the fnancial  
crisis   arising   from   the   banking   sector   demonstrated   a   failure   of   the   corporate  
governance  system,  despite  the  apparent  strength  of  corporate  governance  codes  of  
practice and policy documentation. The governance model enshrined in agency theory  
and   shareholder   accountability   failed   to   prevent   failures   in   risk   management,  
boardroom  ethics  and  remuneration  structures.  Shifts  in  terminology  have  occurred  
continuously since the turn of the century in the domain of responsible investment with  
new  terms  evolving  and  superseding  each  other  at  a  rapid  pace[8].  Investigating  the  
recent  evolution  of  private  SER  and  responsible  investment  more  broadly  is  crucial  to  
furthering an understanding of the evolution of the fnancial markets more broadly and  
to  gaining  insights  into  whether  the  status  quo  of  theoretical  fnance  is  steadfast  or  
whether there is a merging of institutional logics.  
Recent   years   have   witnessed   substantial   change   within   the   UK   institutional  
investment  industry.  We  interpret  this  change  through  the  lens  of  institutional  logics:  
 
the  emergence  of  a  “responsible  investment  logic”,  coexisting  and,  to  some  extent,  
rivalling the long-standing “fnance logic” in mainstream institutional investment. The  
emergent   responsible   investment   logic   involves   the   development   of   separate   but  
parallel   processes   such   as   one-on-one   meetings   between   SRI   managers   and   CSR  
  
managers on ESG issues, as well as the emergence of separate SRI analyst branches of  
the institutional investment industry.We trace this development looking at key events  
and  factors  which  have  contributed  to  the  development  of  this  responsible  investment  
logic.  
There  is  a  long  history  of  “ethical  investment”  which  differs  substantially  from  
current  responsible  investment  practice.  Ethical  investment  has  been  followed  for  
decades  (if  not  centuries)  by  investors  wishing  to  invest  money  according  to  strict  
ethical principles and involved themanagement of relativelysmall, dedicated portfolios  
and fundswhich screen outcompanies according to ethical/green criteria[9].The history  
and  performance  of  purely  ethical  funds  have  been  well-documented  and  is  not  the  
subject of this paper: we are interested in the evolution of responsibleinvestment which  
uses  a  best-in-sector  strategy  and  has  infltrated  mainstream  investment  portfolios  
(Gregory et al., 1997; Hancock, 1999; Harte et al., 1991; Holden-Meehan, 1999; Knowles,  
1997; Luther and Matatko, 1994; Luther et al., 1992; Mallin et al., 1995; Williams, 1999).  
Therefore our analysis (Table I) refer to the emergence of responsible investment in the  
UK which we gauge from around 1990.  
Since  around  the  turn  of  the  century,  there  has  been  a  distinct  shift  away  from  
screening  strategies  and  towards  direct  engagement.  For  example,  Friends,  Ivory  and  
Sime, around 2000, implemented an engagement approach for SEE issues, encouraging  
companies  to  listen  to  their  institutional  fund  managers  and  make  recommended  
changes  to  corporate  strategy  (Litvack,  2002).  Another  large  institutional  investor,  
Morley  Fund  Management,  launched  an  SRI  engagement  programme  intended  to  
monitor  investee  companies’  SEE  behaviour  around  the  turn  of  the  century  (Pensions  
Week, 2002). At a similar point in time, many UK pension funds started to advise their  
fundmanagers to adopt an SRI strategy of activeengagement. Forexample, the trustees  
of   the   Church   of   Scotland   pension   fund   were   instructed   to   review   the   fnancial  
implications of the church pension fund’s SRI policy and consequently decided to move  
away  from  a  screening  strategy  and  towards  a  strategy  of  engagement  with  investee  
companies on SRI issues, as there were fears that screening reduces investment return  
(Boatright, 1999; Wadsworth, 2002).  
Greater engagement and dialogue between institutional investors and their investee  
companies  have  been  promoted  since  the  Cadbury  Report  (1992)  highli  
for  the  institutional  investment  community  to  accept  responsibility  for  corporate  
governance  and  discharge  accountability  to  their  clients  through  more  active  share  
ownership.  The  recent  Stewardship  Code,  despite  its  lack  of  regulatory  backing,  
provides  a  solid  architecture  for  the  development  of  more  effective  engagement  and  
dialogue with a focus on accountability and transparency by institutional shareholders.  
Further, the Stewardship Code explicitly advises institutional investors to escalate their  
activism in relation toESG issueswhereproblems arisewithin their investeecompanies.  
  
  
 
Date    Event  Contribution to responsible investment logic  
1992    Cadbury Report published    First policy document to stress the importance of institutional  
investor engagement with investee companies  
1997    Huntingdon Life Science  UK institutional investors and later US investors pulled out of  
Huntingdon Life Science over animal rights abuses  
2000    GRI guidelines launched  First guidelines for sustainability reporting launched. They are  
now in their fourth generation  
2001    FTSE4Good series  These UK SRI indices include companies which are rated as  
launched  performing well across ESG criteria  
2001    Change to the UK pension     Mandatory requirement for all institutional investors to disclose  
fund law  in the Statement of Investment Principles the extent to which, if  
at all, they consider social, ethical and environmental issues in  
their investment decision making  
2002    Institutional Shareholders’    The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents:  
Committee (ISC) Code  Statement of Principles established a benchmark for institutional  
published  investor practice in the areas of engagement and voting  
2001    Association of British  This set of guidelines indicated what SEE information  
Insurers’ (ABI) SEE  institutional investors would like to see disclosed  
reporting guidelines  
2000    Carbon Disclosure Project     This global institutional investors’ collaborative group asks  
(CDP) launched  companies to complete an annual survey on carbon emissions  
and related information  
2005    Freshfelds Bruckhaus  Specifed the consideration of ESG issues to be part of a pension  
Derringer Report  fund’s fduciary duty where: there was a consensus among  
published  pension fund members where ESG issues were deemed material  
2006    Stern Review published  Stern Review stated scientifc consensus on global warming and  
had an immediate impact on society  
2006    Revision of UK Company      Legal endorsement for companies to consider stakeholders in  
Law  their decision making  
2006    UN endorsement of PRI         Endorsement of the PRI Principles by the UN provided them with  
greater international profle  
2007    ABI revised guidelines  Revised guidelines alter terminology from SEE to ESG disclosure  
2010    Stewardship Code  ISC code adopted by the FRC as a code aimed to enhance the  
published  quality of engagement between institutional investors and  
companies  
2010    BP crisis  High profle oil spill in Gulf of Mexico highlighted fnancial  
nature of ESG risk  
Table  I.  2010    PRI Clearinghouse  The establishment of the Clearinghouse Engagement Platform  
The evolution of a  marks a distinct step towards greater collaborative activism  
responsible  among global institutional investors on ESG issues  
investment logic in  2011    FairPensions Report  Report specifes the need for pension funds to redefne fduciary  
the UK  published  duty to incorporate broader issues such as ESG  
 
 
The  process  of  private  meetings  between  companies  and  their  institutional  investors  
represents  a  core  element  of  engagement  and  dialogue  and  an  important  aspect  of  
institutional   investor   stewardship.   Private   SER   constitutes   a   signifcant   part   of  
responsible  investment.  Historically,  responsible  investment  has  been  called  ethical  
investment,  SRI  and  consideration  of  ESG  issues.  Responsible  investment  is  currently  
thecommonly usedterm, as it is perhapsdeemed to have less negative connotations and  
may  be  more  acceptable  to  the  wider  fnancial  and  corporate  community.  Responsible  
investment  is  a  strategy  now  adopted  by  mainstream  institutional  investors  which  
involves  taking  ESG  considerations  into  account  in  the  investment  decision-making  
process.  
 
 
One  of  the  actors  instrumental  in  the  process  of  integration  is  the  United  Nations  
Principles  of  Responsible  Investment  (UNPRI).  UNPRI  has  produced  six  principles  to  
guide responsible investment. UNPRI currently has just over one thousand signatories  
representing a total of $30 trillion dollars of investment which equates to 25 per cent of  
  
global assets (Piani, 2011). On average, institutional investorswho have signed up to the  
UNPRI  are  commonly  involved  in  four  campaigns  at  any  point  in  time,  as  UNPRI  
represents   a   forum   for   collective   action   and   collaboration   between   institutional  
investors.  The  2011  Report  on  Progress  (PRI,  2011)  found  that  94  per  cent  of  asset  
owners   and   93   per   cent   of   investment   managers   have   a   responsible   investment  
policy[10].  Piani  describes  UNPRI  Clearinghouse  as  representing  a  hybrid  disclosure  
process,  not  public  and  not  private.  This  hybrid  form  of  social  and  environmental  
activism  and  reporting  (Gond  and  Piani,  2011)  is  connected  to  private  SER  but  is  not  
synonymous   with   it.   The   collaboration   is   likely   to   infuence   the   way   in   which  
institutional  investors  communicate  with  their  investees  in  private  meetings  and  
probably  informs  the  private  reporting  process  to  some  extent.  Overall,  the  work  of  
UNPRIseems, at least on the surface, a signifcantmovetowards integratingESG issues  
into  the  heart  of  institutional  investment  and  institutional  investors’  engagement  and  
dialogue with investee companies.  
One  of  the  interesting  aspects  of  the  development  of  the  PRI  and  of  the  responsible  
investment agenda more broadly is the role of social activists. Indeed, the institutional  
literature recognises the role of entrepreneurs in instigatingnew institutional logics and  
organisational  change  (Lounsbury,  2001).  The  founder  of  the  PRI,  James  Gifford  came  
from  an  activist  background  and  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  the  evolution  of  a  
responsibleinvestment logic. Lounsbury (2001) showed  
the ecological movement helped to create a recycling industry and played a key role in  
the diffusion of recycling programs across USA colleges and universities” (Lounsbury,  
2008, p. 355). A similar phenomenon is evident in SRI. Indeed, research has shown that  
social movements can have a substantial impact on the development of new industries,  
as well as institutional change (Lounsbury et al., 2003)[11]. The Student Environmental  
Action  Coalition  in  the  USA  was  central  to  driving  forward  recycling  programmes  in  
schools. However, there has been relatively little research into the integration of social  
activists’  agendas  into  mainstream  organisations  (Giugni,  1998;  Giugni  et  al., 1999;  
Lounsbury, 2001). The role of social activists in the evolution of responsible investment  
has  not  been  researched  but  is  evident  in  discussions  with  members  of  the  SRI  
community[12].  
A  signifcant  feature  of  responsible  investment  is  the  relatively  recent  evolution  of  
private  SER  processes.  There  is  a  stream  of  literature  which  has  investigated  the  
evolution  of  these  processes  of  one-on-one  engagement.  The  majority  of  academic  
research  into  private  reporting  channels  has  focussed  on  private  fnancial  reporting  
(Holland,  1998a,  1998b;  Holland  and  Doran,  1998;  Holland  and  Stoner,  1996;  Roberts  
et al., 2006;Solomon andSolomon, 1999). There is a relativelysmall but expanding body  
of  research  into  private  SER.  Friedman  and  Miles  (2001)  identifed  the  beginning  of  a  
change in attitude within the City of London towards SRI. Solomon (2009) sketch  
  
 
transformation   of   SRI   from   a   marginal   to   a   mainstream   issue   within   institutional  
investment.  Solomon et al. (2002) p  
t  
including  an  increasing  societal  interest  in  social  responsibility,  as  well  as  the  activities  of  
special interest groups. Such shifts may be due to a shift in societal expectations (Laughlin  
  
1987, 1991), “[c]hange will take place as organisations react to broader changes that impact  
on the institutionalenvironment inwhich they exist” (Broadbent et al., 2001, p..Solomon  
and Darby (2005) s  
investors and their investeecompanieswere collaborating to create a joint greenmyth of  
social  and  environmental  accountability.  Such  a  myth  is  consistent  with  institutional  
change  which  is  cosmetic  rather  than  genuine.  Solomon  and  Solomon  (2006)  showed  
from  interviews  with  the  UK  institutional  investors  that  the  private  SER  process  was  
beginning  to  become  more  formalised  and  structured  and  demonstrated  an  interplay  
between  private  and  public  SER.  Solomon  et  al.  (2011)  demons  
incidence ofclimate changewithin the private SER and theway inwhichclimate change  
is  starting  to  dominate  the  agenda  with  respect  to  other  ESG  issues.  Indeed,  climate  
change represents an increasingly crucial infuencing external factorwhich represents a  
shock  to  the  institutional  investment  community.  Exogenous  shocks  which  affect  
society are identifed in the literature as factorswhich can drive institutional change and  
the emergence of new institutional logics.  
We  present  the  emergence  of  the  responsible  investment  logic  by  identifying  the  main  
factors and events driving its evolution. There are a host of other mechanisms within  
the  responsible  investment  process  which  involve  engagement  and  dialogue  on  
social   and   environmental   issues   including   investor   roadshows,   voting   and  
web-based  disclosures/blogs  and  other  forms  of  dialogue  with  investors  and  other  
stakeholders.  However,  there  is  a  growing  body  of  academic  literature  devoted  to  the  
face-to-face  verbal  communication  between  companies  and  their  institutional  investors  on  
social  and  environmental  issues  and  shaping  this  new  rival  logic  within  the  institutional  
investment industry in tabular form. Table I[13]   
investment  logic  by  marking  signifcant  events  that  have  encouraged  and  led  to  greater  
engagement  by  the  UK  institutional  investment  community  with  investee  companies  on  
ESG issues. Theemergence of responsibleinvestment practices, especially private SER as a  
form  of  responsible  investment  practice,  represents  an  emerging  logic  in  institutional  
investmentwhich hasgrown in asimilarway to theemergence of theperformance logic and  
its threat to the incumbent trustee logic in the mutual fund industry (Lounsbury, 2007). T  
emergence  of  the  responsible  investment  logic  has  led  to  private  SER  practices/processes  
carrying  on  not  in  different  organisations  within  the  investment  industry  (as  with  the  
existence  of  different  mutual  funds)  but  in  parallel  with  fnance-dominated  practice  in  the  
form of private fnancial reporting practices.However, thegrowth of responsibleinvestment  
has  also  witnessed  a  degree  of  heterogeneity  with  some  institutional  investors  focussing  
more  heavily  on  the  responsible  investment  logic  and  others  not,  e.g.  Hermes,  Friends  
Provident, Hendersons as champions of SRI:  
Multiple logics can create diversity in practice by enabling variety in cognitive orientation and  
contestation  over  which  practices  are  appropriate.  As  a  result,  such  multiplicity  can  create  
enormous  ambiguity,  leading  to  logic  blending,  the  creation  of  new  logics  and  the  continued  
emergence of new practice variants (Lounsbury, 2008,   
  
It seems from the existing literature, as well as from practitioner studies, that there has  
been  a  gradual  transformation  in  the  attitudes  of  the  UK  institutional  investment  
community  towards  ESG  issues  and  that  since  the  turn  of  the  century,  increasing  
attention has been given to these issues within the private reporting context. However,  
 
   
it  has  remained  uncertain  whether  this  transformation  has  resulted  in  the  genuine  
integration of ESG issues into private fnancial reporting and therefore the mainstream  
investmentdecision-making process. In otherwords, private SERmay continue to stand  
separately from private fnancial reporting, with different actors involved in each set of  
  
meetings  and  little  or  no  joined-up  thinking  linking  the  two.  Previous  research  has  
shown  that  private  SER  processes  have  been  growing  but  suggest  that  the  meetings  
have been running separately from the mainstream private fnancial reporting process.  
In   this   paper,   we   analyse   the   views   of   the   corporate   and   institutional   investor  
communities towards the private SER process and seek to discover the extent to which  
private  SER  is  remaining  separate  or  integrating  with  private  fnancial  reporting.  We  
aim to discover whether private reporting is starting to mirror current trends in public  
reporting by adopting an integrated approach.  
 
3.  Research  method  
We conducted 39 interviews with representatives[14] from companies listed among the  
FTSE100  and  from  leading  UK  investment  institutions  during  2007  and  2008.  In  the  
analysis, we have coded the interviewees as C1-19, to refer to the company interviewees  
and I1-20 to refer to the institutional investor interviewees.We asked the interviewees a  
series of questions about theirviews and experiences of the evolution of the private SER  
process,  directing  specifc  questions  to  their  perceptions  of  the  future  of  private  SER.  
The interviews weresemi-structured and we encouraged interviewees to talk freely and  
at  length  in  a  self-refective  manner.  We  analysed  the  interview  data  interpretively  
allowing theframework to evolve out of theinterviewees’ discussions.This interpretive,  
interview  approach  to  research  in  fnance  and  especially  investigation  into  private  
reporting processes has grown in popularity in recent years in the academic accounting  
and  fnance  literature  (Holland,  1998a,  1998b;  Holland  and  Doran,  1998;  Holland  and  
Stoner, 1996; Roberts et al., 2006;Solomon andDarby, 2005;Solomon andSolomon, 2006;  
Solomon  et  al., 2011;  Solomon  et  al., forthcoming).  The  interview  method  is  also  
inkeeping  with  earlier  studies  of  the  evolution  of  institutional  logics.  The  empirical  
application  of  institutional  logics  has  implemented  interviews  as  a  research  tool.  For  
example,  Thornton  (1999)  combin  
how institutional logics changed from an editorial to a market focus within the Higher  
Education publishing industry.We use the interview data toexamine how the situation  
described in Table I i  
any  shift  in  institutional  investment  focus  from  purely  fnancial  to  a  holistic  approach  
where  fnancial  and  non-fnancial  factors  are  combined.  Similarly,  Green  et  al.  (2008)  
used interviews with corporate boardmembers toexamine howcompeting institutional  
logics  shape  institutional  felds.  Further,  we  only  have  interview  data  from  listed  
companies  and  it  would  be  informative  to  ask  similar  questions  of  the  institutional  
investment community. There are naturally limitations to the use of interview method  
as the companies’ and investors’ public faces within the interview situation may differ  
from their private face. Although publicly our interviewees may discuss environmental  
issues,  they  may  not  place  the  same  emphasis  on  these  issues  within  the  context  of  
  
  
  
 
private SER. The focus of the research is on the UK context, as this paper represents the  
culmination of about 15 years’ research by the authors into the evolution of responsible  
investment in the UK.  
 
4.  Interview  fndings  
  
Our   interviewees   provided   evidence   to   support   the   emergence   of   a   responsible  
investment  logic  through  the  development  of  private  SER.  Further,  the  interviews  
provided   evidence   that   private   SER   is   gradually   merging   with   private   fnancial  
reporting. Thisdevelopmentseems,from the perceptions of our interviewees and in our  
interpretation,  to  represent  an  increasingly  integrated  approach  to  private  reporting.  
The  fndings  are  discussed  in  the  following  sections:  the  evolution  of  a  responsible  
investment  logic  and  private  SER  (supporting  Table  I);  merging  of  private  SER  with  
private fnancial reporting: evidence of a new institutional logic, evidence of resistance  
to  private  SER  and  to  the  responsible  investment  logic;  perceptions  concerning  the  
future of private SER; and evidence for the emergence of integrated private reporting.  
 
4.2 Evolution of private SER and evidence of the responsible investment logic  
Our discussions with the company and investor interviewees indicated that there were  
a range of features characterising the emergence of a responsible investment logic and  
specifcally  the  development  of  private  SER  including:  the  timing  of  the  emergence  of  
private SER; private SERbecomingmore proactive,more frequent andmoremature; the  
growing perception that social and environmental issues are increasingly perceived as  
fnancial issues; and increasing frequency of private SER. The investorsweinterviewed  
provided  a  strong  business  case  for  responsible  investment  which  demonstrated  a  
best-in-sector strategy and not a screening strategy, consistent with the development of  
responsible investment rather than earlier forms of ethical investment:  
[…]  we  don’t  do  any  screening,  no  negative  or  positive  screening;  we  really  are  just  high  
conviction long term investors[…] the idea is to pick companies that are good for the planet,  
good for society, good for health,whatever the issuemay be and thatultimately if they’re great  
companies then they will make even better returns for our clients (I1).  
Our  interviewees  indicated  a  signifcant  change  in  private  SER  over  a  short  period  of  
time  and  pinpointed  the  shift  in  attitude  towards  private  SER  within  the  institutional  
investment community as around the turn of the century:  
Well it’s changed quite considerably really because if I go back 7 or 8 years, the institutional  
investors would not want to talk to[company] about anything to do with social orenvironmental  
issues at all andwewould regularly publishenvironmental reports at the end of the year for all  
our operations and they would not want to receive anything, as simple as that (C1, emphasis  
added).  
Both the company and the investor interviewees were specifc about the ways in which  
private  SER  had  evolved  in  recent  years  and  explained  how  the  sophistication  and  
proactive nature of private SER had evolved:  
[…] initially we were asked a large number of questions over a wide range of subjects and we  
were very reactive;Where they do engage uswe’reextremely responsive sowe go out of ourway  
to  get  back  to  them  and  to  give  them  the  information  they  want,  barring  stuff  that’s  
commercially confdential. So I think that we’ve moved from being very reactive to being more  
proactive and we’re in a better place.  […]  I  felt  at  some  stages  there  was  an  overreaction  and  
over expectation on the part of[…] their expectations of the company were unrealistic. I think  
now  the  expectations  are  much  more  realistic,  they’re  much  more  understanding  of  the  
constraints  we’re  working  with  and  much  more  supportive  of  us  working  within  those  
constraints (C6, emphasis added).  
 
 
 
In a nutshell it’s [private SER] now much more proactive, much more positive and much more  
routine. I think 10 years ago if youwent into ameetingwith business and askedthem about the  
environment or this or that, therewas, forsomecompanies, a degree of reticence in getting into    
that kind of discussion. Now it’s routine business as usual, so actually the challenge now is not  
somuch asking the basic questions, is actually having the probing questions and knowing the  
relevant and appropriate questions to ask.[…]The dialogue ismuchmoreinformed.We’ve got  
obviously much beyond – have you got a policy, to actually – what does that mean for you as  
a business and where is it building your business reputation, what are the risks, how are you  
managing  them.  So  it’s  now  a  much  more  informed  debate  than  it  was  I  think  10  years  ago  
(I10, emphasis added).  
There  was  a  feeling  among  the  company  interviewees  that  the  level  of  questioning  in  
private SER had matured, the number of topics covered had lessened and the dialogue  
had become more focussed:  
2  years  ago  it  [private  SER]  was  a  massive  shopping  list  (all  laugh)  that  never  once  did  we  
manage   to   cover   all   of   the   issues,   but   […]   in   general,   they’ve   become   more  focussed  
conversations,  hard  to  say  how  many  topics  but  it’s  probably  no  more  than  half  a  dozen  
maximum. Sometimes it may be just one or two issues or one issue may dominate the meeting  
and then it’ll just be a couple of quick questions on other topics (C7, emphasis added).  
Our  interviewees  appeared  to  pinpoint  the  most  signifcant  change  to  one/two  years  
before  the  interviews,  i.e.  about  2006/2007.  This  seems  to  represent  a  watershed  in  the  
extent  and  nature  of  private  SER.  Indeed,  the  interviewees  perceived  there  was  a  
growing  acceptance  among  companies  and  investors  that  social  and  environmental  
issues are in fact fnancial issues and arematerial[15]. Indeed, they suggested that social  
and  environmental  issues  are  no  longer  perceived  as  “non-fnancial”  issues  but  as  
fnancial  in  nature.  This  is  a  sea  change  in  perceptions  relating  to  issues  which  were  
traditionally deemed “soft” or “qualitative”:  
[…]  climate  change  for  business  isn’t  an  environmental  issue;  it’s  a  fnancial  issue  (C1,  
emphasis added).  
 
I think too that people are really understanding that [environmental risk] is a material risk for  
investors,  that  this  isn’t  some  ‘willy  nilly’,  ‘pie  in  the  sky’  thing  […]  they’re  [environmental  
issues]becomingmorematerial[…] because oil is approaching record highs, because we have  
a  cap  and  trade  system  in  Europe  […]  because  the  polar  ice  cap  is  melting  and  it’s  literally  
material now (I1, emphasis added).  
The  interviewees’  comments  suggest  that  the  recently  emerged,  but  hitherto  separate,  
responsible  investment  logic  is  starting  to  don  the  appearance  and  terminology  of  the  
dominant  fnance  logic  in  institutional  investment.  Indeed,  the  emerging  responsible  
investment   logic   is   enshrined   in   the   business   case.   Materiality   of   social   and  
environmental  issues  appeared  important  from  a  risk  perspective  as  the  interviewees  
discussed  the  fnancial  effect  of  social  and  environmental  issues  on  company  value  in  
terms of the downside rather than the upside:  
  I think very few companies are actually given credit for doing anything particularly positive  
but they will suffer the consequences of doing something wrong (C15, emphasis added).  
Our interviewees considered that social andenvironmental issues werematerial to their  
businesses, with one company estimating materiality thresholds at £50 million (C1, C3)  
and another at £10 million (C2):  
  […] well they’re [social andenvironmental issues] hugelymaterial, they are hugely signifcant.  
(C3, emphasis added).  
 
If you’re dealing with a company where actually you’ve got industrial process of a signifcant  
type then you’ve got to conform to environmental legislation. Your risks of not conforming to  
that legislation are really signifcant to the extent of people losing licence to actually operate.  
So  yes they are very material (C15,  emphasis  added).  
Interestingly,  a  legitimacy  theory  explanation  for  environmental  risk  management  is  
prevalent here, as companies are clearly concerned about their license to operate, as well as  
fnancial  penalties  attached  to  losing  this  license.  The  view  that  social  and  environmental  
issues constitute a fnancial risk was prevalent throughout the interviews:  
I  think  what  has  changed  is  the  way  that  investors  have  started  to  frame  those  issues  in  
relation  to  investment  decisions.  So  it’s  no  longer  just  the  case  of,  ‘are  you  complying  with  
environmental legislation?’, it’s more, ‘how are you going to take advantage of the low carbon  
economy and the opportunity that presents to sell products?’. So it’s a huge switch in thinking,  
so there’s on one hand a risk to be controlled, on the other its very much, how are you going to  
maximise this opportunity (C2, emphasis added).  
Again the perceptions of the corporate, as well as the investment community, seem to have  
shifted such that social and environmental issues are now acknowledged as being material:  
I’ve spent a couple of hours with[investment institution] about amonth or so ago and they are  
starting  to  look  at  SRI  far  more  seriously  and  they  are  plotting  a  lot  of  businesses  and  we’re  
included in that (C3).  
These  comments  support  the  notion  of  an  emerging  responsible  investment  logic  but  
one  which  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  business  case,  materiality  and  fnancial  risk/risk  
management.  Indeed,  the  evidence  from  the  interviews  supports  the  emergence  of  a  
responsibleinvestment logic, as suggested inTable I, and provides animage of theways  
inwhich private SER has developed as aprimarymechanism of responsibleinvestment,  
a unique characteristic of UK institutional investment.  
One driving force behind the increasing integration of private SER into mainstream  
institutional  investment  identifed  by  the  interviewees  was  the  growing  importance  of  
climate change to both companies and their core institutional investors:  
[…]  so  we  often  get  –  can  we  come  and  meet  just  to  talk  about  climate  change,  we  want  to  
understand your point of view (C7).  
 
“climate change is a genie out of the bottle and it’s such a global issue its effects are enormous”  
(C8, emphasis added).  
 
I’ve  seen  the  emphasis  on  the  areas  of  climate  change  and  global  warming  has  signifcantly  
increased  in  the  last  3  to  4  years,  it’s  come  almost  to  the  head of the list of issues that  they’re  
dealing with (C11, emphasis added).  
  
Solomon et al. (2011) showed  
risks   
perspe  
a  jol  
 
 
within the institutional investment community:  
Institutional  systems  undergo  change  for  both  external  and  internal  reasons.  Exogenous  
changemay be occasioned by disruptions occurring in wider or neighboringsystems[…] that    
destabilize existing rules and understandings (Scott, 2008, p. 437).  
The  growth  of  private  SER  has  clearly  been  spurred  on  by  increasing  concerns  about  
climate change:  
I   think   it   [private   SER]   will   grow,   dialogue   on   these   sorts   of   issues,   particularly   as  
environmental  social  problems  become  a  bit  more  of  a  mainstream  issue,  just  because  they  
become more of a societal issue (I13).  
Investors  discussed  changes  in  society’s  attitudes  towards  social  and  environmental  
issues  as  a  result  of  increased  awareness  of  potentially  catastrophic  problems  such  as  
globalwarming. Such changesmay be interpreted as shifts in societal attitudes and both  
companies   and   investors   are   struggling   to   adapt   to   these   changes   within   their  
institutional settings. Such shifts in societal expectations can drive shifts in institutional  
logics.  
 
4.2 Emerging integrated private reporting  
Our  interviewees  provided  evidence  of  a  merging  of  the  private  SER  process  with  
private  fnancial  reporting  also  the  involvement  of  mainstream  fund  managers  and  
senior corporate directors in private SER meetings. Such merging of these two hitherto  
separate forms of private reporting indicates, in our view, the emergence of integrated  
private  reporting.  When  asked  to  what  extent  they  felt  that  material  social  and  
environmental  issues  were  being  integrated  into  mainstream  fnancial  one-on-one  
meetings, one company representative said:  
There are mainstream investors and mainstream investor representatives who are starting to  
ask questions (C12).  
The investors we interviewed were keen to integrate private SER into private fnancial  
one-on-one meetings:  
Yes to date most of mine [meetings] are purely devoted to social and environmental issues but  
going forward, we’re trying to get the mainstream analysts and fund managers involved in it.  
They  have  one-on-one  meetings  all  the  time  on  fnancial  issues  so  the  idea  is  that  maybe  we  
might get one or 2 questions at the end on social and environmental issues (I2).  
The   interviewees   indicated   that   social   and   environmental   considerations   are  
increasingly  discussed  in  “mainstream”  meetings  (i.e.  private  fnancial  reporting)  and  
questions   on   social   and   environmental   issues   are   being   increasingly   asked   by  
mainstream fund managers:  
A lot of fundmanagersnow incorporateelements of it [social andenvironmental issues] as part  
of their discussions with you. However, often you meet only with SRI specialists at that fund  
as  well  as  at  a  separate  meeting.  So  I  can  think  of  a  couple  of  institutions  that  we’ve  met  
recently where we initially had ameeting with a[mainstream] fundmanager who incorporated  
  
  
small elements of SRI in the discussion but then a couple of weeks later the company also met  
the SRI specialist so that allelements of itwere covered for that fund as awhole (C16,emphasis  
added).  
We interpret these changes and pressures for change as a shifting of institutional logic,  
as separate private SER is continuing but the dividing linebetween it and“mainstream”  
  
private  fnancial  reporting  is  starting  to  blur,  as  social  and  environmental  issues  are  
increasingly discussed within the context of private fnancial reporting. The emerging  
rival logic isbecoming integrated into thedominant logic. It is as if private SER isslowly  
being subsumed into private fnancial reporting:  
I   think   in   the   past   it’s   [quantity   of   social   and   environmental   issues   into   mainstream  
institutional  investment]  probably  been  quite  limited  but  now  […]  that  relationship  is  
defnitely growing and I think certainly for some funds, fund managers can’t make decisions  
about  investing  in  a  company  without  approval  from  the  SRI  team  to  say  that,  yes  this  meets  
their criteria around whatever their SRI agenda might be as well. (C16, emphasis added).  
When  asked  specifcally  whether  social  and  environmental  issues  were  present  on  the  
agenda  of  mainstream  fnancial  one-on-one  meetings,  interviewees  indicated  that  they  
were and that this was a very recent development:  
The answer is yes and no, but two years ago, no it wouldn’t have been (C1).  
 
[…]  as  regards  climate  change,  it  will  be  quite  a  signifcant  proportion  of  the  [mainstream  
private  fnancial  reporting]  agenda  now  […]  when  we’re  thinking  of  how  we  explain  a  new  
investment,  more  so  now  than  it  ever  has  been,  we  will  be  looking  at  the  social  and  
environmental  aspects  that  go  alongside  that,  that  will  give  a  broader  picture  of  what  we’re  
trying to do (C1, emphasis added).  
Theinterviewees explained that inmeetingswith themainstream fundmanagers, social  
and environmental issues are discussed:  
[…] probably up to about a year ago it would have only been the SRI person or the person that  
was interested in governance. That changed at the start of this year [i.e. 2008] and now the big  
[mainstream] fund managers are asking questions about climate change. Now it’s interesting  
to know where they’re getting their intelligence from; it’s almost certainly from the SRI fund  
manager  providing  it  internally  and  then  coming  back  down  through  the  mainstream  route  
(C1, emphasis added).  
This provides an interesting insight into the workings of the information process, or at  
least the companies’ perceptions of this process. It is notable that the word “big” is used  
to  refer  to  what  are  “mainstream”  fund  managers,  as  if  SRI  managers  are  considered  
“small”.  This  suggests  that  companies  may  take  the  “smaller”  SRI  managers  less  
seriously  than  the  “big”  ones.  Consequently,  it  is  likely  that  if  the  mainstream  fund  
managers are starting to ask questions about ESG issues thencompanieswill takemore  
notice.Again, speaking of the integration of social andenvironmental issues into private  
fnancial   reporting   there   was   a   distinct   increase   in   especially   climate   change  
information discussed in this previously exclusively “fnancial” context:  
I  think  there  is  no  doubt  that  environmental  issues,  the  impact  of  climate  change  and  so  on,  
now feature in discussions in a way that perhaps, 5 or 6 years ago they didn’t (C5).  
Investors  discussed  the  increasing  integration  of  social  and  environmental  issues  into  
fnancial meetings and also into fnancial portfolio management models:  
I think the biggest evolution thatwe’ve seen at[investment institution] iswe’renow verymuch  
more focussed on very company specifc integrated engagements with our portfolio managers  
around  how  these  issues  impact  strategy  and  where  the  company’s  going  with  meetings  at  
senior  board  level  that  feed  directly  into  investment  decisions.  Can  all  these  issues  be  
 
 
quantifed all thetime?No, but they do feed into thementalmodels that our portfoliomanagers  
have  of  companies,  so  that’s  still  integration.  So  our  evolution  has  been  very  much  more  on  
making sure these things are integrated (I3,  emphasis  added).  
Indeed,  the  investors  provided  substantial  evidence  of  increasing  integration  of  social  
  
and environmental considerations into the mainstream investment process:  
My  role  is  looking  for  the  SEE  [social,  ethical  and  environmental]  factors  that  are  important  
and are impacting both balance sheets, to make sure the analyst knows about these and then  
they  themselves  can  look  at  them  and  assess  them  on  company  specifcs.  You  can  call  it  
mainstreaming  if  you  like  but  it’s  more  just  integrating  what  used  to  be  2  separate  things  –  
they’re  not  anymore  because  they  are  real  and  they  are  causing  opportunities  and  they’re  
causing  risks  that  need  to  be  managed  and  it’s  just  part  of  assessing  a  company  now  and  
analysing a company (I6, emphasis added).  
The  increasing  appearance  of  mainstream  fund  managers  in  private  SER  also  
indicated  progressive  integration  of  private  SER  into  mainstream  institutional  
investment:  
[…] we’ll be meeting with the SRI people but they will bring the fund managers in sometimes.  
So not always but quite often they will bring the fundmanager into themeeting (C6,emphasis  
added).  
The interviews with the investors provided insights into why they sometimes included  
mainstream fund managers in private SER:  
We also have the equity analyst and fund manager involved when it’s an important meeting  
(I15).  
As  well  as  ESG  issues  being  integrated  increasingly  into  private  fnancial  reporting,  
there  is  an  increasing  incidence  of  senior  directors  attending  private  SER,  rather  than  
just  the  CSR  managers  as  has  been  the  case  previously.  A  greater  focus  on  corporate  
strategy  also  indicated  a  progressive  integration  of  private  SER  into  the  mainstream  
consideration of corporate performance:  
What I think has changed is increasingly those sessions [private SER] have now become truly  
face to face, true question and answer sessions, our senior team devoting time to sit with them  
(C18, emphasis added).  
 
[…]  the  quality  of  response  typically  that  we  get  from  management  of  companies  and  the  
board  of  companies  has  improved  signifcantly.  We  fnd  typically  the  Chief  Executives  and  
Chairs  and  senior  independent  Non  Executive  Directors  are  better  placed  to  answer  our  
questions in a way that they would have deferred before to their CSR manager, if they existed  
(I16, emphasis added).  
The  companies  we  interviewed  described  a  more  continuous  dialogue  on  social  and  
environmental  issues.  The  companies  explained  that  they  were  more  conversant  with  
social and environmental issues and could talk about them more easily in private SER  
than before:  
  
  
  
I think when we started off on this route looking at more of the social aspects and integrating  
them into the environmental stuff, we did quite a lot of preparation, we just don’t do that now  
because  we’ve got a team who know this stuff inside out […]  (C1,  emphasis  added).  
Senior  management  and  directors  are  now  expected  to  be  conversant  with  social  and  
environmental issues and answer questions in investor meetings with investors which  
  they were not before:  
[…] corporate governance, health & safety, environment, these are all reached at board level;  
the board will also be considering those, there’ll be a lot of responsibility there so it’s really at  
the top level. It’s certainly not a case where the CEO is unaware of CSR; he has to be aware and  
he  is  fully  aware,  so  it’s  top  level  down  […].  we  do  have  some  investors,  some  we’ve  met  
recently,  who  will  be  very  much  focused  on  fnance  but  they  also  […]  will  invest  simply  in  
companies that have a good corporate governance attitude or good social attitude or consider  
the environmental impact as well (C10, emphasis added).  
 
“our  CEO  […]  sits  on  our  board  CSR  committee  anyway  so  he  can  handle  lots  of  questions”  
(C12, emphasis added).  
 
4.3 Resistance to private SER and the responsible investment logic  
Although ourinterviewees identifed anumber of areas of resistance to private SER and  
to the apparent ongoing increase inengagement on social andenvironmental issues, the  
general  trend  appeared  to  be  that  resistance  was  diminishing  across  the  board.  The  
linking of ethics/responsibility with fnance is likely to meet with resistance in a similar  
way to the predicted resistance to linking health andmoney in healthreform (Broadbent  
et al., 2001)[16]. It seems from our interviews that the analyst community was resistant  
to the integration of private SER into mainstream institutional investment. Integration  
of social andenvironmentalinformationseemed to becoming through the analysts’ role  
although  very  slowly.  Indeed,  resistance  to  integration  of  social  and  environmental  
information into mainstream institutional investment seemed to arise principally from  
the fnancial analysts’ community:  
[…] my sense is that even in those 2 years, things have changed quite dramatically but it is in  
a more indirect, subtle way, we’re still not getting the mainstream analysts asking those direct  
questions of the executiveteam, but they are increasinglycoming throughme and certainly I’ve  
seen  calls  for  more  engagement  and  I  guess  a  greater  maturity  in  the  type  of  question  that’s  
being  asked.  […]  So  I’d  say  even  in  the  past  2  years,  I’ve sensed a growing maturity in what  
analysts are asking […] but  it’s  very  diffcult  for  us,  from  a  corporate  point  of  view,  what  is  
driving  that;  whether  that  is  indeed  just  that  the  SRI  community  is  evolving  as  opposed  to  
quite separate or indeedwhether there’s this crossoverwith themainstream and you’re getting  
greater  integration;  I’d  like  to  think  that’s  what  is  causing  it,  but  again  it’s  hard  to  see  direct  
evidence of that; it’smostlymore indirect, conversationswith the analysts, the brokers etc. (C7,  
emphasis added).  
Similarly,   our   investor   interviewees   explained   that   fnancial   analysts   and   fund  
managers  had  had  no  interest  in  ESG  issues,  but  that  this  was  beginning  to  change,  
there is still an unwillingness among the analyst community to engage on ESG issues:  
[…]  if  all  analysts  put  equal  value  on  that  kind  of  thing  [social  and  environmental  problems  
within companies] then it could actually be a fundamental driver in the value of a stock - but  
they don’t yet, they’re all marginal but I hope that maybe that will change (I5).  
Analysts  present  resistance  as  they  are  much  slower  to  integrate  issues  than  the  
buy-side investors and fund managers. Is this a case of decoupling, as the analysts are  
not taking social andenvironmental integration on board,whereas actorsmore senior in  
the institutional investment and corporate communities are? Although fund managers  
 
 
and   buy-side   are   increasingly   asking   questions   in   meetings   about   social   and  
environmental concerns, analysts are not:  
The   questions   [on   social   and   environmental   considerations]   weren’t   being   asked   by    
mainstream  investors  and  to  some  extent  they’re  still  not  being  asked,  probably  to  a  large  
extent  they’re still not being asked by mainstream analysts (C7,  emphasis  added).  
Furthermore the infuence and involvement of analysts has lessened:  
[…] the sell side is a route to the institutions as well. So there’s the direct dialogue with our key  
shareholders  and  then  there’s  the  indirect  through  the  sell  side  […]  in  the  last  few  years  the  
importance of the sell side analysts as a channel has lessened; the large institutions havebecome  
more  self-suffcient  on  their  fundamental  research  and  perhaps  have  been  a  little  more  
demanding in meeting with the companies than they used to be. So less arms’ length through  
the analysts now than it was maybe 10 or 15 years ago (C17, emphasis added).  
Earlier  reliance  on  analysts  by  institutional  investors  meant  that  ESG  was  not  
integrated because the analysts were not taking it seriously. They were acting as a  
wall of resistance to integration.As investors rely less on analysts andmore on their  
own research, there ismore integration of social andenvironmentalinformation?As  
analysts   become   less   important,   they   are   less   of   an   obstacle   to   integration.  
Institutional   investors   (buy   side)   becoming   more   self-reliant.   Neoinstitutional  
theory  discusses  the  potential  for  incumbent  structures  and  people  to  provide  
resistance  to  new  mechanisms  of  (for  example)  governance  and  accountability  
within the institutional environment:  
[…]  knowledgeable  and  experienced  practitioners  that  inhabit  many  organizations  will  
frequently  attempt  to  resist  the  introduction  of  formal  control  practices  by  manipulating  the  
application   of   such   new   practices,   transforming   them   into   means   for   advancing   their  
respective interests[…] (Fiss, 2008,   
Such resistance by incumbent parties imbued with the dominant long-standing fnance  
logic   is   consistent   with   the   neoinstitutional   academic   literature   which   identifes  
resistance to organisational change (Broadbent et al., 2001). Resistance was interpreted  
as an “uneasy truce”between rival logics of science care inmedical education (Dunn and  
Jones,  2010).  Despite  the  apparent  rival  nature  of  responsible  investment  logic  and  
fnance  logic,  the  business  case  approach,  whereby  ESG  issues  are  starting  to  be  
perceived  as  material  fnancial  issues,  implies  that  these  logics  may  gradually  be  seen  
not  as  antagonistic  but  rather  supplementary  to  each  other[17].  Indeed,  as  analysts  
begin  to  appreciate  the  business  case  underlying  the  consideration  of  ESG  issues  in  
investment  decisions,  their  resistance  to  incorporating  these  factors  is  diminishing.  
Responsible investment specialists talked liberally about the resistance they struggled  
with among the fnancial analysts and fnancial fund managers:  
The real diffculty we have is proving to fund managers and hardened analysts that it makes  
any difference in terms of share price. But we are a business where it’s core to what we do so  
it’s taken as read this is what we do (I10).  
   A  chief  reason  why  mainstream  analysts  discount  ESG  issues  is  because  they  tend  to  
impact  companies  over  the  medium/long  term,  whereas  analysts’  time  horizons  are  
short-term:  
And  of  course  the  City  is  very  short  term,  it’s  only  looking  quarter  to  quarter.  [FTSE100  
company] is saying, ‘this is going to save usmoney in 2012 onwards, trust us; we’re doing this  
  
now because of the longterm’. Forme as a longterm investor that’s fantastic; for hardened City  
analysts it’s uninteresting because they want to know what’s happening next quarter (I10).  
The  investors  we  interviewed  felt  they  had  a  role  in  educating  analysts  so  that  they  
would come to appreciate and understand the relevance of ESG issues to “mainstream”  
fnancial investment management:  
What we’re trying to do is get the fund managers and the analysts to have a basic, reasonable  
knowledge of these sorts of issues, or the risks in this area that companies might face. So if it’s  
mining they might need to know some of the problems in certain countries and what climate  
change  might  mean  for  a  mining  company,  whether  there  are  water  shortages  or  more  
hazardousmining techniques, things like that. So it’s trying to bringthem on a little bit sowhen  
theymeet thecompanies, if they feel it’s appropriate, they can ask the questions.[…]We’re not  
trying to convert them into anything; we’re just trying to better educate them so they’re better  
able  to  do  their  jobs  safely.  As  I  say  some  are  more  responsive  than  others  (I19,  emphasis  
added).  
Similarly:  
Analysts [who] have purely focussed onfundamentals andmay not have looked at this sort of  
thing – my role is to educate them a bit into why they need to be looking at these other bits and  
pieces as well, they might be important. It’s tied into the question as well that we often get is  
would you ever divest from a company because of an SEE situation and our response to that  
is  –  not  one  thing  –  it’s  the  same  with  the  fundamental  analysis,  you  wouldn’t  divest  just  
because one fnancial ratio was out of alignment, you’d look at it (I6, emphasis added).  
The way in which the now initiated institutional investorcommunity is “educating” the  
analystcommunity is inherent in a shift in institutional logics.The resistance appears to  
be breaking down gradually with analysts taking an increasing interest in ESG issues  
as they are increasingly “educated” by SRI specialists:  
I  think  that  dialogue  will  become  more  formalised  […]  and  it  is  already  with  the  sell  side  
analysts arranging more meetings on these [ESG] issues (I15).  
Indeed, some investors suggested that the analysts’ resistance had broken down to the  
extent  that  they  no  longer  viewed  ESG  separately  but  rather  as  part  of  the  fnancial  
considerations:  
[…] increasingly they[ESG] aremainstream issues and for ourown equity analysts, they don’t  
seethem assomething that they should consider in addition to the fnancials; they look at it as  
part of the, interms of – is thiscompany a sustainablecompany? Ishow it’smanaging its risks  
on SEE as effective as how it’s managing its liabilities or its debts or whatever else (I15).  
Aswell as the analystcommunity, thecompaniesthemselves presentedsome resistance  
to private SER but again this resistanceseemed to bediminishing.Aswith the analysts,  
neoinstitutional theory suggests that organisations will resist change and the growing  
private SER process represents a signifcant change in companies’ relations with their  
institutional  investors.  Resistance  from  the  corporate  side  to  private  SER  and  further  
  
integration  of  private  SER  appeared  to  arise  from  companies’  fears  about  sharing  
forward-looking  information  with  their  core  investors.  However,  the  interviewees  
suggested that these fears were diminishing over the past few years:  
 
 
[…]  there’s  always  a  risk  about  sharing  future,  forward  looking  statements  with  investors;  
there’s always a debate in business about safe harbour and the extent to which you cannot get  
legal prosecution or institutional investors dropping you as a shareholding. But we’ve taken a  
bitmore of a proactiveview over the last 4 or 5 years that themore they understandwhatwe’re  
doing, actually the more confdence they have (C1, emphasis added).  
  
 
For us there’s the potential disadvantage of sharing information, being open and transparent  
to  the  extent  that  they  see  more  risk  to  investing  than  others  who  are  less  transparent  and  
again it’s a very delicate balance to play[…] (C7).  
Despite the evident cost in time and resources of private SER, the companies seemed to  
feel that these were outweighed by the benefts of the meetings and discussion:  
[…] it [private SER] costs usmoney as an organisation because you have toemploy people and  
they spend time doing it, but[…] the cost for us of not doing it would be immense (C6).  
It  seems  that  integration  has  accelerated  signifcantly,  as  these  pockets  of  resistance  
have started to weaken.  
 
4.4 Perceptions concerning the future of private SER: increasingly integrated private  
reporting  
We asked our interviewees how they perceived engagement and dialogue on social and  
environmental  issues  would  evolve  in  the  future  and  in  what  ways.  The  interviewees  
believed that private SER would continue to increase and also continue to become more  
integrated into mainstream institutional investment:  
I  don’t  think  there’s  any  doubt  this  [private  SER]  will  grow,  as  I  said  in  terms  of  people’s  
interests as they take a more holistic view of a company’s performance (C8, emphasis added).  
I  think  [private  SER]  it  will  continue  to  increase;  my  personal  view  would  be  over  the  
nextfew years,environmentwill continue tobecome a bigger and bigger issue andwe’ll  
get more questions about it (C10, emphasis added).  
The companies perceived climate change as the driving force behind the increasing  
integration  of  private  SER  into  one-on-one  meetings  with  mainstream  institutional  
investors:  
Speaking  to  my  area  specifcally,  climate  change,  I  think  it  is  going  to  become  much  more  
mainstream because I think the world ismoving towards sort of a global carbon standard and  
the cost of carbonwill factor inalmost everythingwe do[…] So I see that as just doing nothing  
but growing and becoming a bigger part of that dialogue in the future (C11, emphasis added).  
 
I  think  in  the  short  term  engagement  and  dialogue  will  increase,  largely driven by the climate  
change  agenda,  largely  driven  by  potential  increases  in  legislation  and  how  businesses  will  
respond  to  them  […]  it’ll  become  much  more  embedded,  much  more  mainstream  (C18,  
emphasis added).  
Interviewees  also  discussed  a  potentially  paradoxical  situation  that  as  integration  
continues to increase, private SER will actuallydiminish, as itbecomesmore part of the  
mainstream engagement and dialogue fgured strongly in the discussions:  
If  the  current  trend  of  discussions  on  climate  change  continues,  interestingly  enough  I  think  
the SRI community will actually reduce because I think the mainstream managers will start to  
understand whatsome of these issues are about[…] we’ve worked terribly hard toembed it in  
our  business  to  the  extent  that  the  vast  majority  of  our  board  could  probably  talk  quite  
eloquently on many of these issues[…]. So I think the engagement will decrease on social and  
environmental  issues  as  specifc  [meetings]  but  they’ll  come  through  the  mainstream  (C1,  
  emphasis added).  
Well I’m making a fairly heavy bet that I’m right in that people will increasingly focus on this  
as  a  part  of  their  normal  mainstream  investment.  Normal  mainstream  investment  means  
pulling out the 5 reasons to invest in a stock: Thematerial risks and opportunities; where they  
ftwith a responsibleinvestmenttheme; it should be discussedwith thecompany and it should  
be, when the CEO comes in, one of the questions we ask them – if it’s not material it shouldn’t  
be  discussed.  So  yes  I’d  see  it  as  moving more and more into part of the way my mainstream  
sector analyst talks to his broker and the way the broker speaks to IR and the way we speak to  
the company when they come in, rather than a separate SRI person speaking to the CSR team –  
much more involved in the mainstream (I8, emphasis added).  
 
I  think  that  in  10  years’  time  every  investment  is  going  to  have  to  have  some  kind  of  ESG  
application  and  that’s  going  to  come  because  of  the  UNPRI  [United  Nations  Principles  of  
Responsible Investment] and some legislation (I18).  
External change inclimatewill encourage institutional investors to align their activities  
with  the  expectations  arising  from  societal  expectations  and  ethos  (Broadbent  and  
Laughlin, 1991; Laughlin and Power, 1996).  
It’s  really  important  that  my role is eventually phased out and  the  IR  team  are  doing  it  as  one  
joined-up story and they shouldn’t need to be experts in climate change or carbon capture and  
storage or these things (C7).  
This feeling that the specialist roles in companies may disappear as ESG issues merge  
with fnancial issues was mirrored by the investor interviewees’ views:  
I would like to hope that it just becomes, I suppose, my job, effectively null and void and that it  
becomes part of themainstream. So I hope that itwillbecome absolutely [integrated] and you’ll  
have  a  set  of  questions  on  key  performance  areas  from  a  fnancial  perspective  and  in  every  
meeting you have questions onhow they’re looking atenvironmental and social issues – that’s  
what I would hope and I don’t see any reason why that can’t be (I5, emphasis added).  
From   the   investors’   point   of   view,   this   increasing   integration   of   ESG   into   the  
mainstream  could  also  imply  the  capture  of  ESG  issues  (now  deemed  fnancial)  by  
the  mainstream  fnancial  analysts  and  fund  managers  who  previously  resisted  the  
responsible investment logic:  
I’d  hope  that  even  more  issues  would  get  mainstream  and  that  the  ESG  dialogue  won’t  be  
special  meetings  but  will  be  part  of  the  general  roadshow.  The  interesting  issue  is  whether  
we’ll still be allowed to do it because for example climate change used to be pretty much our  
preserve  –  now  it’s  gone  so  mainstream  that  some  of  the  mainstream  analysts  are  almost  
saying – it’s far tooimportant for you guys, you little liberals to be faffng around! (both laugh)  
Yeah, I hope it would get more mainstream (I20).  
Such  disappearance  of  separate  private  SER  is  suggestive  of  the  integration  and  
incorporation of the responsible logic of ESG into the dominant fnance logic such that  
the  fnance  logic  of  private  fnancial  reporting  becomes  inclusive  of  ESG  issues  and  
logic,                               
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more holistic. This also refects the shift in public sustainability reporting, whereby the  
ultimate objective in its evolution appears to be the production of one integrated report  
which integrates material social and environmental issues into the mainstream report,  
making the production of separate sustainability reports unnecessary (IIRC, 2011). We  
 
 
present this optimistic outcome as scenario one in Figure 1.  
Alternately,  the  merging  of  private  SER  and  private  fnancial  reporting  could  
represent a simulacrum of a hybridisation of institutional logics, whereby private SER  
is  effectively  absorbed  into  private  fnancial  reporting,  losing  its  potential  to  effect  
  
change.  This  less  optimistic,  more  sceptical,  vision  is  represented  as  scenario  two  in  
Figure  2.  Neoinstitutional  theory  has  been  somewhat  preoccupied  with  the  notion  of  
ceremonial  or  superfcial  conformity  by  organisations  when  faced  with  institutional  
pressures to change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Decoupling can arise where  
organisations  are  forced  to  adopt  structural  changes  but  “decouple”  them  from  actual  
practices  by  constructing  practices  which  simulate  genuine  change  (see,  for  example,  
Archel et al.’s fndings for stakeholderengagement). The evolution of private SER could  
be interpreted in this light, as themeetings have been seen as opportunities for ritual and  
myth creation and appear to have little effect on investment decision-making (Solomon  
et al., forthcoming).  Such  decoupling  may  be  interpreted  as  a  response  to  pressure  for  
institutional  change.  A  linked  response  is  for  organisations  to  “internalise”  the  threat,  
incorporatingnew types of actorswho are experts in dealingwith these issues.The evidence  
provided  in  this  paper  could  suggest  that  integrating  SRI  managers  into  private  fnancial  
reporting  may  be  a  way  of  absorbing  and  neutralising  the  “threat”  from  the  responsible  
investment  community  rather  than  genuinely  integrating  the  issues  into  the  heart  of  
fnancial  private  reporting  processes.  Certainly,  the  evolution  of  private  SER  with  the  
development  of  a  separate  process  running  parallel  to  private  fnancial  reporting  with  the  
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emergence since the late 1990s ofSRImanagers andSRI analysts resonateswith the fndings  
of earlier work (Hoffman, 1997[18]. The emergence of new roles and actors can enhance the  
strength of the emerging logic or weaken it (Scott, 2008). F  
these responses are occurring, but on the basis of our data, we cannot yet establish whether  
these changes will lead to scenario one or scenario two.  
 
5.  Concluding  discussion  
This paper provides substantial evidence that integrated private reporting is starting to  
emerge.  Interviews  with  representatives  from  FTSE100  companies  and  from  the  UK  
investment institutions confrmed that a responsible investment logic has evolved in a  
relatively short space oftime,with private SER developing as animportantmechanism of  
responsible  investment.  Further,  our  fndings  highlight  what  may  be  interpreted  as  a  
hybridisation of institutional logics within the institutional investment community. Instead  
ofremaining amarginal and separateelement of institutionalinvestment, our fndingsshow  
that  private  SER  is  merging  with  private  fnancial  reporting.  This  merging  appears  to  
represent   the   integration   of   responsible   investment   into   mainstream   institutional  
investment.  We  suggest  that  this  trend  represents  the  emergence  of  integrated  private  
reporting,  mirroring  a  similar  trend  in  the  public  reporting  sphere.  Our  interviewees  were  
directly involved in private SER and talked about the long-term changes in attitude within  
the institutionalinvestmentcommunity in the private SER process.They noted resistance to  
this process of institutional change in attitude and behaviour from within the institutional  
investment  community,  most  notably  among  fnancial  analysts,  as  well  as  from  the  
corporate community. However, as the role of analysts in institutional investment weakens  
and   as   the   analysts   themselves   begin   to   accommodate   hitherto   “non-fnancial”  
considerations into their remit, the level of resistance seems to be diminishing. Traditional  
attitudeswhich prioritise the fnancial andmarginalise the “non-fnancial”seem less and less  
relevant  to  contemporary  fnancial  markets.  This  is  the  frst  paper  which  suggests  the  
emergence  of  integrated  private  reporting  and  thus  makes  a  contribution  to  accounting  
theory, as well as to the practice of private reporting. Further, a practical policy implication  
arisingfrom the research could be the need for education of the fnancial analystcommunity  
in the materiality of ESG issues.  
This  paper  seeks  to  advance  studies  in  institutional  theory  by  demonstrating  the  
emergence  of  a  coexistent  responsible  investment  logic  embodied  in  private  SER  and  
 
 
running  in  tandem  with  established  private  fnancial  reporting  meetings  (i.e.  the  
dominant fnance logic in investment). Institutional logics have hitherto not been used  
as  a  means  of  interpreting  the  growth  of  responsible  investment  and  private  SER.  
Therefore,  we  feel  that  this  paper  contributes  to  the  theoretical  feld  of  institutional  
  
logics  by  extending  the  application  of  this  theoretical  framework  into  a  new  area.  
Further,  as  private  SER  merges  increasingly  with  private  fnancial  reporting,  it  is  
possible that there is a shiftfrom adominant fnance logic to an increasingly hybridised  
institutionalinvestment logicwhich is holistic in nature featuring integratedinvestment  
considering   both   fnancial   and   ESG   issues   together   in   mainstream   institutional  
investment strategy and decision-making.What we see, similar to the fndings of Dunn  
and  Jones  (2010),  may  not  be  the  replacement  of  the  fnance  logic  with  the  responsible  
investment logic but rather a metamorphosis of the institutional investors’ perceptions  
from the dominant fnance logic into a holistic logic within institutional investment and  
corporate   governance.   This   emergence   of   a   hybrid   logic   may   also   represent   the  
coexistence  of  a  logic  of  responsibility  with  the  dominant  fnance  logic  is  similar  to  
fndings for other institutional domains, for example:  
[…] plural logics co-evolvewithin a profession overtime.We found that care and science logics  
coexist, moving through periods of balance and imbalance and residing in perhaps an uneasy  
tension that is not easily resolved in medical education (Dunn and Jones, 2010, p. 139).  
There are alsosimilaritieswith thework of Lounsbury (2007)where   
industrywas found to have shiftedfromdominance by a trustee logic to a fnancial logic  
over   time.   Indeed   we   are   seeing   a   reverse   situation   where   the   UK   institutional  
investment industry ismovingfrom ashort-termist fnancial logic to a responsible logic  
with  greater  emphasis  on  the  long  term.  Such  merging  of  logics  could  signal  the  
emergence  of  integrated  private  reporting  mirroring  trends  to  produce  integrated  
reports in the public reporting arena.  
The   apparent   hybridisation   of   hitherto   soft,   qualitative   factors   with   fnancial  
considerations may however be interpreted in a different manner. From an institutional  
theory  perspective,  it  is  possible  that  a  new,  hybridised  institutional  investment  logic  
may instead be simply the long-dominant fnance logic dressed as something different.  
The growth of responsible investment (itself perhaps a euphemism to appease hardline  
investors) may be interpreted as the neutralisation of SRI and of any activist social and  
environmental agenda within the institutionalinvestmentcommunity, originallyaimed  
at  transforming  corporate  behaviour.  Taking  a  critical  view,  it  is  possible  that  the  
strategies of resistance to pressure from the responsible investment actors has been to  
redefne ESG in fnancialterms, to talk ofmateriality of social andenvironmental issues  
and  to  redefne  terminology  to  apparently  integrate  RI  into  the  mainstream.  Such  
attempts by the mainstream institutional investment community may be interpreted as  
strategies of resistance to organisational change (Broadbent et al., 2001). The increasing  
involvement  of  senior  directors  and  mainstream  fund  managers  in  the  private  SER  
engagement  process  may  be  more  about  absorption  and  neutralisation  of  the  SRI  agenda  
than  about  genuine  integration.  From  this  perspective,  we  may  be  witnessing  absorption  
(Broadbent et al., 2001)  of  the  responsible  investment  logic  into  the  fnancial  logic.  This  
alternative and rather jaundiced view is nevertheless consistent with recent interpretations  
of  stakeholder  engagement  processes,  as  well  as  of  the  private  social  and  environmental  
processes  as  ritual,  myth  creation  and  the  institutionalisation  of  unaccountability  (Archel  
et al., 2011;  Solomon and Darby, 2005;  Solomon, 2010).    
 
 
interpretation represents an extension of theoretical work in private reporting.  
There  are  also  other  issues  at  work  within  the  institutional  investment  community  
which could be playing a part in the apparent hybridisation of logics. The investors are  
keen  to  grow  and  maintain  their  client  base  and  clients  are  currently  attracted  to  
investment   institutions   which   appear   to   be   responsible   in   a   climate   of   increasing  
environmental  awareness  and  concern  for  human  rights.  Such  moves  by  the  institutional  
investmentcommunity are likely to be in linewith current expectations and consensus of the  
UK society at large. By “looking like” responsible investors, the institutionsmay be seeking  
to  align  their  attitudes  and  activities  with  those  of  society  at  large.  There  are  also  tax  
incentives forcompanies tobecomemore socially responsible. Further research is necessary  
to assess the extent to which this evident integrative process falls into either scenario one or  
two.  Further  research  is  now  required  to  explore  the  nature  of  the  increasing  integration  
through the eyes of other agents within the institutionalinvestmentcommunity involved in  
this private SER process, for example, analysts.  
A  possible  explanation  for  this  precipitous  metamorphosis  from  fnancial  logic  to  
fnancial/responsible  logic  may  be  the  growing  societal  awareness  of  climate  change  
and  of  its  substantial  implications  for  the  fnance  industry  and  fnancial  institutions  
inter alia. Indeed, the rate of growth of the responsibleinvestment agenda has increased  
intensely over the past 10 years, as discussed throughout the paper.A “jolt” as pervasive  
and global as climate change has perhaps accelerated the nascent institutional change  
within the investment industry and within the process of engagement and dialogue:  
Environmental  jolts  highlight  institutionalized  assumptions  about  the  environment,  and  
reveal   unexpected   relationships   between   institutionalized   practices,   technologies,  
organizational forms, and outcomes that may not be apparent in times of stasis[…] Jolts can  
prompt   feld-wide   crisis,   that   is,   perceptions   by   feld   actors   (organizations,   regulators,  
investors,  customers,  etc.)  that  fundamental  outcomes  are  in  contrast  to  expectations,  and  
precipitate action intended to avoiddramatic negativeoutcomes (Sine and David, 2003, p. 186).  
The  growing  recognition  that  traditional,  purely  fnancial  indicators  are  no  longer  
suffcient  for  investors  to  value  and  appraise  corporate  performance  and  success  is  
manifesting  itself  in  new  and  emergent  forms  of  dialogue  between  investors  and  
investees which could be holistic, integrated and inclusive. Despite thepessimistic view  
of institutional change presented in scenario two, the strength of the underlying social  
movement  and  its  success  in  infltrating  mainstream  institutional  investment  may  
imply  that  the  merging  of  private  SER  and  private  fnancial  reporting  could  result  in  
genuine  change  over  time.  “[…]  the  embedding  of  social  movement  discourse  and  
practice  within  conservative  institutional  frameworks  holds  out  the  possibility  of  
continued  social  change,  albeit  in  much  less  visible  and  dramatic  ways”  (Lounsbury,  
2001,  p.  52).  Instead  of  responding  to  the  perceived  “threat”  of  a  growing  responsible  
investment logic, by developing a genuinely holistic approach to institutionalinvestment, it  
may   be   that   the   absorption   of   responsible   investment   into   mainstream   institutional  
investment  represents  a  strengthening  of  the  fnancial  logic  by  assimilating  responsible  
investment  mechanisms  such  as  private  SER  into  mainstream  fnancial  meetings  and  
  
fnancial  investment  decision-making.  To  echo  Greenwood  and  Suddaby  (2006)  bringing  
social  and  environmental  issues  into  private  fnancial  reporting  and  into  the  heart  of  
mainstreaminvestment processes,investment institutionsmay in fact be rejecting the status  
quo  of  how  to  do  things  but  at  the  same  time  the  logic  of  shareholder  value  may  remain  
 
 
untouched,   or   even   strengthened,   reinforcing   the   status   quo   of   “who”   benefts   (i.e.  
shareholders).   Positive   impacts   on   other   stakeholders   are   likely   to   be   coincidental  
by-products rather than intended consequences.  
The  way  in  which  earlier  forms  of  ethical  investment  have  been  overtaken  by  
  
responsible  investment  which  is  embedded  in  the  business  case  and  in  a  shareholder  
value  approach  may  be  seen  as  an  “amoralising[19]”  of  traditional  ethical  investment  
and its roots in ethics and morality: responsible investment going forward may simply  
become fnancialinvestmentwith inclusion of ESG factors according purely to fnancial  
considerations. In this scenario, all ethical, philanthropic, social responsibility concerns  
are  subordinated  to  fnancial  considerations.  This  has  certainly  been  supported  by  
research  into  private  meetings  on  climate  change  issues,  as  these  were  found  to  be  
dominated by a discourse of (fnancial-related) risk and opportunity.  
To  summarise,  the  merging  of  private  SER  with  private  fnancial  reporting  bears  
striking  similarity  to  current  attempts  to  develop  integrated  reporting  in  the  public  
disclosure  [20].  Indeed,  it  seems  that  private  reporting  channels  may  be  following  
public  reporting  channels  by  attempting  to  integrate  sustainability  information  into  the  
heart  of  mainstream,  traditionally  fnancial  reporting  processes.  Or  it  may  be  that  private  
reporting channels are leading public reporting in this area, causality is hard to identify. As  
for  sustainability  reporting,  the  change  in  discourse  (adopting  more  fnancial  terms  to  
disclose  sustainability  information)  within  sustainability  reports  over  time  may  refect  
attempts by corporates to neutralise the sustainability agenda rather than genuinely engage  
with  it  (Tregidga and Milne, 2006).  Similar  shifts  in  discourse  within  the  responsible  
investment  environment,  from  a  discourse  of  ethics  (as  pertaining  to  traditional  ethical  
investment)  to  a  discourse  of  risk,  opportunity  and  shareholder  value  (the  business  case)  
may  similarly  be  neutralising  the  original  agenda  for  bringing  greater  responsibility  into  
institutional investment via private SER. This neutralisation could, if not countered, signal  
the end of ethical and socially responsible investment. Further research is needed to assess  
the extent to which either of these scenarios are borne out by evidence.  
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Notes  
1.   Private   fnancial   reporting   is   the   term   used   to   refer   to   one-on-one   meetings   between  
institutional investors and their investee companies which focus on fnancial concerns.  
2.   Screening  has  been  defned  as,  “Avoiding  investments  in  companies  that  do  not  refect  an  
investor’s values[…] The screening process is the inclusion or exclusion of corporate securities in  
investment portfolios, supporting companies with strong records in certain screens and avoiding  
investments in frms that fall short in these areas” (Henningsen, 2002, p.  
3.  This shift in focus and the growth of responsible investment has been noted in the academic  
and  practitioner  literature,  for  example,  Ambachtsheer  (2005),  Friedman  and  Miles  (2002),  
Mansley (2000),McCann et al. (2003),SSolomon et al. (2002) and Sparkes (2002).  
4.  There  are  a  host  of  other  mechanisms  within  the  responsible  investment  process  which  
involve  engagement  and  dialogue  on  social  and  environmental  issues  including  investor  
roadshows,  voting  and  web-based  disclosures/blogs  and  other  forms  of  dialogue  with  
investors  and  other  stakeholders.  However,  there  is  a  growing  body  of  academic  literature  
devoted to the face-to-face verbal communication between companies and their institutional  
investors  on  social  and  environmental  issues,  and  this  paper  focusses  exclusively  on  the  
process of private SER.  
5.  See  Solomon  and  Solomon  (2006)  and  Solomon  et  al.  (2011)  for  e  
separate private SER meetings, their content and role in responsible investment.  
6.  This  paper  adopts  a  framework  deriving  from  the  work  of  Erving  Goffman  on  impression  
management and theatrical behaviour in face-to-face interaction.  
7.   It is interesting that, until recently, SRI and the consideration of ESG factors have been generally  
absent from UK academic and professional training programmes. Only relatively recently have  
ethics,  governance  and  stakeholder  accountability  begun  to  be  incorporated  into  professional  
accounting and fnancial management qualifcations such as ACCA, for example.  
8.  Terms such as: ethical investment, socially responsible investment, responsible investment,  
“social,  ethical  and  environmental”  (SEE),  “environmental,  social  and  governance”  (ESG),  
enhanced analytics, enlightened shareholder value, etc.  
9.  The Sullivan Principles were established in the 1800s. Similarly the activities of the Quakers  
encouraged responsible business practices from the seventeenth century in the UK.  
10.  Note that this refers to asset owners andinvestmentmanagers who are signatories to UNPRI.  
In 2011, the survey covered 539 respondents managing assets of US$29.6 trillion.  
11.  Lounsbury  et  al.  (2003)  found   
efforts  were  ignored  but  that  their  activities  led  to  the  emergence  of  the  modern  recycling  
industry  as,  “[…]  they  provided  a  foundation  for  the  successful  creation  of  a  new  recycling  
industry  since  for-proft  solid  waste  conglomerates  could  rely  on  the  free  labour  of  citizens  
who continued to clean and sort discards in the spirit of ecological goodwill” (p. 96). Further,  
this  change  led  to  a  new  “for-proft”  model.  Similarities  can  be  recognised  between  the  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
infuence of social activists on the growth of recycling and of social/environmental activists  
on the growth of responsible investment.  
12.  One of the authors has hadmanyinformalmeetings and discussionswith leadingmembers of  
the  SRI  community  over  the  past  15  years  and  the  inspirational  and  crucial  role  of  certain  
 
 
individuals    in    driving    forward    the    development    of    responsible    investment    is    a  
“taken-for-granted” known within the this community.  
13.  Dunn  and  Jones  (2010,    
medical education in tabular form.We use a similar approach to document the emergence of  
a responsible investment logic in the UK institutional investment.  
14.  These  were  all  CSR/IR  (investor  relations)  managers  and  SRI  managers  who  were  directly  
involved in private SER.  
15.  Only one outlier (C13) felt that social and environmental considerations were not material.  
16.  “While any group might well resist any change that is imposed upon it, the linking of health  
and money is particularly emotive” (Broadbent et al., 2001, p. 566).  
17.  Dunn  and  Jones  (2010), Peabody  (1927),  alluded  to  a  similar  situation  in  medical  
education regarding the apparently competing logics of care and science.  
18.  Hoffman  (1997)  found   
within  chemical  organisations  to  cope  with  the  demands  from  environmental  lobbyists  (Scott  
2008)  
19.  We  thank  Markus  Milne  for  suggesting  this  interpretation  of  “amoralising”  when  we  
presented the paper at the FRBC conference, July 2012.  
20.  See Solomon andMaroun (2012) for a   
reports internationally.  
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